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UTAH ... 1PR·ME COURT 
.... 
.. r 
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab 
LOCAL REALTY 
a corporation, 
vs. 
V. A. LINDQUIST 
LINDQUIST, his 
COMPANY, ) 
Appellant, { 
and MARY J 
wife, 
Respondents. 
No. 6004 
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
Comes now the Local Realty Company, a corpor-
ation, Plaintiff and Appellant in the above entitled case, 
and respectfully petitions this Honorable Court for a 
rehearing of this matter upon the following grounds 
and for the following reasons: 
1. That the opinion of the court is in error for 
the reasons hereinafter stated. 
2. That the opinion of the court was handed down 
on December 17, 1938, at a time when the competency 
of one of the Justices concurring in that opinion, and 
whose concurrence was necessary to make the prevailing 
opinion the opinion of the court, was in question in 
certain proceedings which resulted in the resignation 
of such Justice on the day that the opinion of the oourt 
was handed down. 
3. That the Home Owners Loan Corporation, an 
Agency of the U. S. of America, and other members of 
the Bar interested in the law of real property and mort-
gages in this state, are perturbed with the opinion of 
the court as it now stands and would like to be heard 
and render assistance to the court in formulating a 
decision in this case. 
ARGUMENT. 
1. H is diffieult for any lawyer to render a more 
eritieal analysis of the errors in the prevailing opinion 
as it now stands than has been done by the dissenting 
Justices in the above case. It ~would likewise be a useless 
expense and duplication to include in this brief such 
criticism and accordingly by reference Petitioner adopts 
and incorpora tos herein tho opinion of Mr .. J nstice ~Wolfe 
in this easo in support of its first ground for granting 
a rehearing iu this f'aso. 
v\r c have considered it elementary that the judicial 
reasoning of an impartial tribunal is founded upon the 
acceptance of certain facts and legal premises from 
which the conclusion and order of the court follows 
regardless of whether or not the ond as such may 
be that desired in so far as the personal prefer-
ences of the members of the tribunal arc coneerned. 
This distinguishes judicial reasoning from the argument 
and reasoning of the advoeatc ~who to support a desired 
result urges reasons to support that result. \V e submit 
that the prevailing opinion is a patent violation of these 
cardinal prineiples. -While relying upon the detailed 
analysis of the dissenting opinion to point this out, may 
we stress the following: 
(a) Petitioner's case is founded upon the following 
Statute of the State of Utah: (R. S. U. 1933, Section 
104-37-37) ''The purchaser from the time of sale until 
a redemption, and a redemptioner from the time of his 
redemption, until another redemption, is entitled to re-
ceive from the tenant in possession the rents of the 
property sold or the value of the use and occupation 
thereof." It cannot be disputed that Petitioner was 
the purchaser at the time of the sale of the property in 
question, that there was no redemption, that the defend-
ants were in possession of the property in question, and 
that the stipulated sum was the value of the use and 
occupation thereof. Under such facts the only question 
before the court is whether or not as a matter of law 
these defendants, only one of whom was the mortgagor, 
were "tenants in possession". If this is so there can 
be no escape from the conclusion that there should be 
judgment for Petitioner. These identical words have 
been construed by the courts of many states and in every 
instance it has been held that the words "tenant in pos-
session'' includes a mortgagor in possession. (See cases 
cited in briefs and in dissenting opinion; repetition of 
these citations and of pertinent wording in these cases 
seems to involve unnecessary expense and mere dupli-
eation.) 
4 
Yet the prevailing opnnon states that this Statute 
"specifically denies the grant of rents and profits to the 
purchaser and expressly recognizes them as the property 
aml money of the owner'' when the statute is just the 
opposite. (Note dissenting opinion). 
The steps to which the writer of the prevailing 
opinion ~went to avoid the plain terms of the Utah Statute 
and the decisions of cases construing the language 
involved, are apparent when one reads the prevailing 
opinion and the briefs filed in this case and eontemplates 
the initiative of the author in departing from the briefs 
and arguments of counsel and discovering that the Utah 
Statute adopted in 1870 had adclitional provisions not 
he1·e in Vl()lvcd which were not present in the parent 
California Statute until two years later. The author 
then cites this statutory difference 'in no way in point 
to eseape Petitioner's daim that the California Statute 
whieh was adopted by Utah in identical words was 
adopted free from the construction of this identical 
~wording by the California courts. 
\Ve quote from the dissenting opinion: 
"Of course it follows thai if as early as 1859 
Califoruia held the statute to give to the pur-
ehaser the eqnitable title and that he vvas entitled 
to the value of the use and occupatio11 from the 
mortgagor or former owner <luring the period of 
redemption, and we adopted that very language 
from the Califomia sial ute in 1870, t!tat we 
acloptccl the construction \\'hich tlw c·onri put on 
that language. The fad thnt the Califomia stat-
ute did 110i adopt 1 l1e part about the a<"connt-
ability until 1872 or two years after we took the 
portion to which the decision in 1859 pertained 
cau make no differeuce, especially in view of the 
California case of Petersen v. Jurras, supra, 
where the California Court gave the same con-
struction to its statute with the accountability 
features added as it did in Harris v. Reynolds, 
supra, \vhen they were absent. 
"And it becomes not only difficult to ascer-
tain how, but astounding that the opinion can 
state that such holding in the McCusker Case was 
"without discussion and citing as authority the 
Lathrop case, supra, which declined to so hold.'' 
A glance at the :i\1cCnsker case reveals the follow-
ing: That not only was the Lathrop Case cited 
(which did not "decline to hold" that the judg-
ment debtor was a tenant in possession, but ex-
pressly left the question open), but there were 
cited Harris v. Reynolds, supra, and Hill v. 
Taylor, supra. In fact, the former is quoted 
from. Other cases are also cited, but the above 
two are definite early authorities on which the 
McCusker Case rests.'' 
(b) We quote from the dissenting opmwn: 
"I think the opinion becomes hopelessly con-
fused in its consideration of the reasons for the 
rent money going to the purchaser. 8ince the 
opinion lays down the principle that the mort-
gagor or owner is not only entitled to possession 
but has all the rights and attributes of title until 
six months after "sale", it of course is precluded 
from holding that rents or value of use and occu-
pation and are an incident of the purchaser's 
status. But since the rents and value of use and 
occupation are given to the purchaser by statute, 
some reason must be found in the opinion for 
giving these to the purchaser. And what reason 
do we find"? That they are given to the purehaser 
(j 
as an offset to his debt. But the idea occurred to 
the opinion writer that in some cases the pur-
chaser might not be the judgment creditor. 8o 
there is inserted in parentheses that the pur-
chaser "is in the status of a creditor". I11 the 
status of a crcdi tor as to what'! If he never was 
a creditor, how can he sueceed to that credit by 
bec·oming a purchaser'? How ean a stra11ger to 
the note secured by the mortgage who is a pur-
chaser be "in the status of a ereditor?" \\"lty 
is he entitled to the renh; and value of usc and 
occupation as a credit on an indebtedness which 
never existed as to him'? Furthermore, it is 
elementary that even the judgment creditor oc-
cupies a different status as a purchaser. !lis 
judgment is satisfied if the property is bought 
in for the debt and costs, and he owns the prop-
erty, not as judgment creditor but as purchaser. 
Why give him credit on an indebtedness which is 
no longer owing'? The fad that in case of m is-
take, \vhere the purchaser is the judgment cred-
itor, there is better opportunity to rectify the 
miRtakc by plaeing the parties in status quo does 
not make him any the less a purchaser and not 
a creditor." 
In connec-tion with this subject we treated the ques-
tion of ti tlc in our original briefs as moot iu this ease 
because the basis of Plaintiff's action was Scetion 104-
37-37. .But how can the reasoning of the prevailing 
opinion on this point stand in face of that part of 
Seetion 1 04-:n -:32 which reads: "If the debtor redeems, 
the effect of the sale is terminated and he is restored to 
his estate.'' U sclcss words, sinec the Court would have 
us understand that the debtor still has his estate! Sec 
also the discussion of this problem in the ease of Mc-
Queeney v. Toomey ct al., (Montana) 92 Pae. 561, where 
statutes ictentieal with those of Utah are construed. The 
prevailing opinio11 expressed itself on this point without 
benefit of eonnsel; with respect to the result we again 
quote from 1lw dissenting opinion: 
'''I' he prC\'ailing opinion g"Ol~S 011 to say that 
our statute "specifically denies the grant of rents 
and profits to the pnn·ltaser and expressly rce-
oguii'.es them as property and J:wncy of the 
owner.'' The statute does not so rn·oyidc. T1 
pro,·idcs just the opposite. It provides that they 
shall go to the purchm;cr bceausc he has all the 
right, tiilc, and interest in the property; but it 
further provides that if the owner or other rc-
denlptioner redeem, the money so collected by the 
purchaser be credited on the redemption price. 
'rhis is harmonious with the conception that the 
})111' ·baser is eutitlcd to tl1c rents and profits as 
;m ineident to his interest, hut that if his eqnitalJle 
estate (11ot merely an equity bnt a full right 
recognii'.ed in cqnity) whieh he has obtained hy 
the purchase, is defeated by redemption, he must 
pay over the rents and profits because all he is 
entitled to is to recoup his purchase price with 
interest. In the anxiety of the opinion to estab-
lish the dodriuc that these rents aml value of usc 
an(l occupation belonged all the time during the 
redemption period to the execution debtor, de-
spite the express statutory provision that the 
pnrehascr was entitled to them, we arc told that 
they are paid to the purchaser as a credit upon 
his debt. And in order to arrive at this con-
clusion a purchaser who never was a creditor is 
b·eated m; a ereditor. Ilc seems to be in the 
"status of a ercditor ". 
"But it seems to me that the crowning ab-
surdity of the whole reasoning is revealed in the 
statement ihat "if there arc any rents due and 
owing· io the owner when the deed issues, they 
lllay vest in the purchaser or his assigns for he 
then is subrogated to and acquires all the right, 
title, and interest to everything the owner could 
assert with respect to the property; including 
title, possession, growing crops, rents," ete. rl,his 
is the first instance in the law that I hn ve come 
across that rents or profits owing to an owner 
before title passes become the property of one 
who buys the real estate. But eertainly if the 
''sale'' does not become complete until six months 
after the "sale" and the rents belong to the 
owner, no passage of title by "subrogation" 
passes such moneys to the purchaser. Nowhere 
in the law can such a principle be discovered. It 
reveals the plight the opinion finds itself in in 
order to justify the statement that the ownership 
of the property remain in the mortgagor for six 
months after sheriff's sale rather than in the 
purchaser as the statute declares. If the owner-
ship is in the purchaser, it follows naturally that 
the rents and value of use and oceupation belong 
to him. If his estate in equity is defeated by the 
happening of the condition subsequent-to-wit, 
redemption-he, by statute, is required to account 
and credit on the purchase price the rents whieh, 
up to such time, belonged to him.'' 
(c) We have at no time suggested that a person in 
possession of property is not entitled to its use and 
occupation. Yet the opinion accuses us of advancing 
this "paradox that destroys itself". The question be-
fore the Court is whether a statute giving Plaintiff the 
right to hold the tenant in possession for the value of 
that uso and occupation means what it says. We 
contend that if the defendants choose to elect to exercise 
their right (in this caso conceded) to possession, thus 
becoming entitled to the use and occupation of the 
!) 
premises, tlwy must, uncler the statute, pay the plaintiff. 
If they do 11ot wish to pay, they have the ehoice of not 
exercising their option. \V c agam quote from the dis-
senting opinion: 
"rriw r·oJdcn1inu is not 1hni ::sc and o;·cupa-
tion C'all be Sl~parnted from IJOssessiou, hut that 
the owm•r in possessim1 after sale must acl·ount 
for tit(' ,-arue of the u:-:c~ and occupation. The 
opi;1iou uselessly sels up and knocks llown a straw 
mall, rorg·cttinp; tlw earlier sta1m::ent in the 
opinion that Califomia holcls this possession a 
mere right of oc·eupancy suhjcc·t to a right in the 
purchaser to the value of the use and occupation. 
ln the Cali l'ornia case of Petersen v. ,J urras, 
supra, it was held that the "right to possession of 
the property was not in issue in the case." Like-
wise', in this ease right to possession is not an 
issue, oHly the question of 'whether the purchaser 
may n~c·over for the usc ancl oeeupa tiou without 
notincation that he intends to do so. 'l'hat is all 
that need he deeicled in thiR case. 
"The opinion goes on to say: "property is 
the right to the use and occupation of a thing or 
io the usufrnet ancl enjoyment thereof and with-
out such right there is no sueh thing as property 
rights in it. Ownership of property is the right 
to enjoy the beneficial interest, the use and oceu-
pation, or to reeeive the usufruet thereof. \Yitb-
out sueh right there is no ownership. Ruch a 
thing- as ownership of realty without benefieial 
iuterest or a possession of real property without 
right of nse an<l oe<mpancy is au absurdity if not 
all in1possihility." Every day owners of property 
lease it so as io deprive themselveR of right of 
occupmwy or possession. T do not sec, therefore, 
that O\\'Jlership \vithm1t right to uRe and oer·u-
paucy is an "ahsurclity if not an impoRsihility." 
But here again as all along in Uw opinion the 
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question of who is the owner during redemption 
period is asserted or assumed. I find no valid 
reasons given in the opinion. Such reasons would 
need to be very convincing in the face of the 
language of the statutes which seem expressly to 
give the purchaser all the right, title, interest. 
and claim of the owner on ''sale'' by the sheriff 
and give him by another section the rents or value 
of the use and occupation during the redemption 
period, and in the face of opinions from every 
state having statutes like ours holdiug to the 
contrary." 
(d) 'J1he prevailing opmwn closes with "three 
other reasons why the owner in possession should not 
be chargeable with rents during the redemption period." 
In our opening brief we tried to point out why these 
and other similar reasons had led many legislatures to 
change statutes originally identical with those of Utah. 
vV e did not suspect that this Court would use these 
reasons-in no way involved in the logic of the legal 
proposition before the court-to legislate a result deemed 
desimble even by the dissenting justices. vV e again 
respectfully submit that this is a matter for legislative 
attention if the conclusion based upon the facts of this 
case coupled with our present law seems socially unde-
sirable. To burden this brief with the results of ex-
perience leading to contrary conceptions would seem 
to be equally inappropriate before this tribunal. To 
support our statement above that some of these reasons 
are not here involved, we say as did the dissenting 
opinion: "It happens that the statutes are different." 
II 
(e) :B'inally, the prevailing opmwn does not deal 
diredly with the questiou of the liability of one of the 
defendants who was not a mortgagor. \Ve submit that 
tl1e opinion :-:hould discuss this point and make definite 
the la v,· com~erned, even though it be held that a mort-
gagor who elects to take possession during the redemp-
tion veriod may do so without liability despite Section 
] 04-:il'-:17. 
But \Ye have already passed beyond our self-imposed 
limitation that it would be an unnecessary and therefore 
useless ta::-;k to dwell further upon the errors in the pre-
vailing opinion. We respectfully submit that if the 
Justice::-; of tl1is Court eonseientiously examine the pre-
vailing all(l disseuting opinions in this case, the briefs 
already· tiled, and if necessary the three key cases of 
Harris v. Reynolds, ~Walker v. McCusker, and Clifford 
& Company v. Henry, the desirability of a rehearing of 
this matter will become at once apparent except to those 
who will not see. 
:2. Likewi::-;e the less said about this ground for 
rehearing tlie better, although we submit that a case 
involving the differences of opinion in the court itself 
and the ramifications and inuendoes of the prevailing 
opinion merits a rehearing when the deciding vote was 
cast under a eloud. 
3. We are authorized to state that without solicita-
tion upon the part of counsel in this case, attorneys for 
the Home Owners Loan Corporation and for Utah banks 
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and trust companies have requested Petitioner to file this 
petition for a rehearing with the thought that if a re-
hearing is granted they may file briefs as amici curiae. 
It seems clear under our decisions that prospective 
amici curiae can not of their own volition request a 
rehearing or file briefs in support thereof, but such 
counsel have indicated their desire to do so if the Court 
desires sueh briefs to be filed in advance of itR ruling on 
this Petition. 
In conclusion may we say that counsel in this case 
have no additional fees to be earned by filing this peti-
tion, and that no hardship will be rendered any party 
in this cause by any delay involved in a more mature 
consideration of this interesting and difficult question. 
It has been our thought that further consideration of 
this case (both by the Court and counsel-see Paragraph 
7 of the Conclusions of the dissenting opinion) might 
assist in harmonizing the divergent opinions now ready 
for the books. In this spirit we respectfully request 
that a rehearing be granted. 
STEPHENs, BRAYTON & LowE, 
and CALVIN BEHLE, 
Attorneys for Petitioner. 
